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A REGIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE ROLE OF 
ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE DECLINE OF AFRICA'S PUBLIC 
SECTOR.
Amankwa, Mark Opoku





The early post-independence periods saw Africa have efficient Public Sector Institutions. Over a decade, 
there seems to be a decadent in the public sector. The study examines the regional analysis of government 
effectiveness in Africa. The study uses data given by the World Bank's Governance Indicator from 55 African 
countries from 2002 to 2018. The study uses Panel Regression Analysis Model of Random Effects and 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares to assess government effectiveness in the five regions of Africa. The findings 
indicate that Southern African countries performed best as compared to its counterpart regions, followed by 
North Africa. However, East, West and Central African countries had low scores on government 
effectiveness. The results imply that electoral politics and political interference hurt the performances of 
public institutions on the continent. 
Keywords: Electoral Politics, Public Sector, Government Effectiveness, Southern Africa, North Africa, East 
Africa, West Africa, Central Africa
INTRODUCTION
The early post-independence period saw Africa have efficient Public Sector Institutions (Gyimah-Boadi & 
Mensah, 2003). In recent times, there seem to be a decadent in the sector due to the kind of political system 
run in most countries on the continent.  The World Bank (2019) contends that government effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the quality of public service, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The quest for measuring the performances or 
effectiveness of government by researchers and policy analysts in public management, public administration 
and public policy increased with universally adopted reforms in the last quarter-century (Ingraham & 
Moynihan, 2000). These reforms centred on bettering government effectiveness and enhancing public 
institutions (Whitford & Lee, 2012). In light of this, recent studies focus on government performances or 
effectiveness. In most developing countries, especially countries on the African continents, the sentiments of 
political parties under the whims and caprices politicians control public institutions. Appiah and Abdulai 
(2017) describe the political system run in various developing countries as “political clientelism”. Political 
'clientelism' is where political parties that are privy to the term of office they have would manage the public 
institutions and resources abysmally. The Human Development Report, 1997 asserts that efforts have been 
instituted by post-independence governments to ensure that the imbalances and inefficiencies in the Public 
Sector breached is amended (Kwasi-Ofosu, 2012).
Stevens and Teggemann (2004) argue that the first wave of reforms in the Public Sector came immediately 
after the independence of many African countries.  The indigenes replaced colonial masters who headed 
these public institutions.  Besides, the colonial masters trained the earliest staff who replaced them.  Also, 
vacant public service positions were merit-based and not on political appointments.  It suggested that 
payment of salaries was on technical skills. Public institutions eliminated the class structures to ensure sanity 
in the system. It invigorated the moral standards in the public sector and serving in public offices also became 
a privilege to those who were appointed to such portfolios to serve with alacrity and integrity. However, the 
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function and efficacy of the Public Sector have become very weak and prone to political aversion. 
Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, (1999); Gyimah-Boadi and  Mensah, (2003) contend that the position that has 
led to the dwindling performance of Public  Sector capacity is due to central government sole distribution of 
resources, the appointment of high public positions by a sole state actor and centralization of political power 
in many African countries. Appiah and Abdulai (2017) attributed this poor performance to lack of political 
parties' willingness to continue reforms when there is a change in government. Despite the many strands of 
literature on government effectiveness, analysis based on regions on the continent on government 
effectiveness and the role of electoral politics on public services is little. Therefore, this paper tends to fill the 
gap. The paper also tends to ascertain which region's governments have been more effective in terms of 
independence of their public and civil service from political pressures, interference and electoral politics. 
The study organizes the paper as follows: the next section presents the literature review and methodology. 
The following section presents the results and discussion of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Role of Electoral Politics in Africa
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) define public sector as general 
government and public corporations, including the central bank (OECD, 2004). The United Nations also 
defines it as general government, public corporations and not-for-profit institutions owned by the state 
(Apreda, 2003).  Moreover, the International Federation of Accountants defines the public sector as national 
governments, regional governments, local governments and related governmental entities (Pina & Torres, 
2003). Further, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines Public Sector as general government (central 
government, state/ provincial/ regional governments and local government) and Public Corporations 
(Financial corporations and non-financial corporations) (Audet, 2003).
Electoral politics in Africa inclined to partisan politics has its roots after independence (Asante & Gyimah-
Boadi, 2004) which is one of the causative factors to government effectiveness on the continent. While some 
public institutions are making giant strides in government effectiveness, others still wallow in weak 
government effectiveness on the continent. For instance, World Bank (2019) asserts that countries like 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius Tunisia, South Africa and Namibia have somewhat strong government 
effectiveness as compared to the rest of the countries on the continent. However, in countries like Ghana, 
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Togo, government effectiveness tend to be weakly attributed to the 
politicization of public institutions (Saul, 2001).
Solingen (2012) argues that the ushering in of electoral politics in advanced countries has helped introduce 
social-political union, ideological solidarity, and national advancement at a deliberate pace proportionate 
with bureaucracy.  However, electoral politics in developing countries centres on ethnocentric, and 
appointment of positions into public institutions have become partisan and ethnical, making the institutions 
ineffective. Harvey (2007) connotes that the advantages from the activity of this order for the most part or 
somewhat disproportionately, accrue to the ruling party, funders of political parties and grassroots 
supporters. Hence their bid to make sure their political parties stay in power and as well maintain their 
positions in the Public Sectors to mismanage the public sector and continue in its inefficiency unabatedly.
Government effectiveness captures the degree of independence of public and civil service from political 
pressures (Sacks & Levi, 2010). Less government effectiveness portrays a public service dominated by 
political pressures which have led to the poor performances in the Public Sector (Frempong and Aryee, 2001) 
and the decline of government effectiveness. For instance, Ghana's multiparty system has relentlessly 
collapsed the participatory approach in the public sector (Harnack et al., 2000). Newly elected governments 
discontinue projects of previous governments. Besides, appointments are on party faithful committed to 
implementing the agenda of the party disregarding individuals' competencies and special abilities.
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Moreover, political parties' concentration on the next elections and how to manoeuvre its way to win the next 
elections has also become a contributor to public sector performances. The study argues that countries with 
high levels of political interference and electoral politics have weak government effectiveness. Specifically, 
the paper contends that the low performances in public institutions are due to the funding of political parties 
(Austin  (Montinola and 
Jackman, 2002; Montes and Paschaol, 2016)  (
METHODOLOGY
Sources of Data
The study uses datasets from 2002 to 2018 sourced from the World Bank's Governance Indicator, covering 55 
African countries on government effectiveness (where -2.5 is weak, and 2.5 is strong). Additionally, this 
paper determines the average government effectiveness of individual countries over the 16 years. The study 
also shows the trends in government effectiveness across the five regions (Southern Africa, North Africa, 
East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa). 
Economic Model
The research uses Panel Regression Analysis Model of Random Effects and Ordinary Least Squares to assess 
government effectiveness in the five regions of Africa. The study aims to carry out a regional comparison of 
government effectiveness in terms of political interference and electoral politics on public services in Africa. 
Therefore, the model of the Panel Regression Model will be as follows:
 and Tjernstrom, 2003), spoil system of governments (Wantu, 2017), corruption




G_E = Government Effectiveness (Political Interference and Electoral Politics on Public Services)
R_O = Regional Output
a0 = Constant
B1= Co-efficient
u= Between entity error 
E= Within entity error
    
G_Eit = a0 + B1 R_Oit + Eit
Dependent Variable
The World Bank (2019) defines government effectiveness as perceptions of the quality of public service, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. In 
effect, government effectiveness, as discussed in this study, is political interference and the role of electoral 
politics on the public services of Africa.
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is regional output where regional output means Southern Africa, North Africa, East 
Africa, West Africa and Central Africa. It is on this wise that the regional comparison will be on: to know 
which of the region's public sector is less of political influence, interference and electoral politics. 
RESULTS
The data discusses the government effectiveness using OLS and Random Regression and Trends of 
government effectiveness of the five regions in Africa (North Africa, Southern Africa, East Africa, West 
Africa and Central Africa) to ascertain the independence of public and civil service from political pressures, 
interferences and electoral politics. 
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Time-invariant 
Time-invariant variables like country code and region have positive between variation and zero within 
variation. However, G_E has more between variations (0.58) than within variation (0.17). The average G_E 
of individual countries ranged between -1.62 and 0.81 across countries but varied over the 16 years for each 
country over time.
Table 1: Time Invariant
Variable Variation Mean St. Min Max 
Code overall 26.5 15.01736 1 52 
 between  15.15476 1 52 
 within  0 26.5 26.5 
      
Year overall 2009.5 4.612545 2002 2017 
 between  0 2009.5 2009.5 
 within  4.612545 2002 2017 
      
G_E overall -0.71959 0.59514 -1.89 1.05 
 between  0.575452 -1.61563 0.806875 
 within  0.170366 -1.40834 0.058534 
      
R_O overall 2.326923 1.205222 0 4 
 between  1.216249 0 4 
  within   0 2.326923 2.326923 
 
G_E is Government Effectiveness, R_O is Region Output
Trends Of Government Effectiveness Across Five African Regions
Figure 1 below shows the trends of G_E across five African regions and overall. Over the 16 years, South 
Africans recorded the highest G_E score, while the central Africans recorded the least G_E over the years. 
G_E for the East and West African countries were approximately stable over the years while North Africans 
recorded some drastic fall in G_E scores from 2010 till 2017 it starts to rise.
Fig 1: Trends in Government Effectiveness 
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Random Effects And Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Results show that countries in the east, west and central Africa had lower G_E scores compared to the North 
Africans. However, the South Africans recorded higher G_E score than the North Africans in all estimators. 
While the regions were overall significantly, predictive of G_E (p<0.001) worked is significant for some 
estimators and not for others. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects were 
significant (P<0.001), indicating that random effect estimator is a better estimator than the OLS. 89% of the 
variation was explained by country-specific term while the rest was due to idiosyncratic error.




regression   Between   
Random 
effects 
Region      
North Africa ref  ref  ref 
South Africa 0.61(0.46 , 0.76)***  0.61(-0.01 , 1.22)  0.61(0.01 , 1.21)* 
East Africa -0.05(-0.17 , 0.07)  -0.05(-0.54 , 0.44)  -0.05(-0.52 , 0.43) 
West Africa -0.19(-0.31 , -0.07)**  -0.19(-0.68 , 0.29)  -0.19(-0.67 , 0.28) 
Central Africa -0.58(-0.72 , -0.45)***  -0.58(-1.12 , -0.05)*  -0.58(-1.11 , -0.06)* 
P-value <0.001  0.0028  0.0008 
R-sq: 0.26     
R2-within   0.00  0.00 
R2-between   0.29  0.29 
R2-overall   0.26  0.26 
Theta      0.91 
Sigma u      0.50 
Sigma e     0.18 
Rho         0.89 
 
Discussion Of Findings
The results indicate that South African countries performed better than all the regions, followed by North 
African countries. East, West and Central African countries had lower scores on government effectiveness in 
that order. The findings suggest that there are less political interference and electoral politics in the public 
institutions of Southern African countries and North African countries than the rest of the regions. Reilley 
(2002) corroborates that electoral politics and political interference plays a vital role in public institutions. 
After elections, it becomes winner takes all, and the government appoints its followers and loyalist to occupy 
such portfolios to take decisions for public institutions thereby creating a massive dent in the performance of 
these public institutions (Philips, 2009). The reasons for the variations are funding of political parties (Farrel 
and Web, 2000; De Miguel, 2011; Gyampo, 2015), educational and training capacities (Mitlin, 2008; Levin, 
2009), corruption (Mbako, 2000; Boaffo-Aurthur, 2008; Abdulai, 2009). 
Gyampo (2015) inclines that democratization led to the emergence of various political parties across Africa.  
The formation of every political party in a country requires funds and public support to be successive in 
various elections. De Miguel (2011) adds that political parties are as the bosses of government since they 
perform development roles of government, preparing of leaders at the various levels of governance, and 
holding governments responsible when out of power. However, regions on the continent having a low score 
on government effectiveness advertently run parties as private organizations where individuals fund these 
political parties for them to fuel them into power as compared to regions with better scores on government 
effectiveness. Therefore, these parties who are explicitly sponsored by private financiers expect the party to 
appoint them into public positions. In most cases, some of these financiers are not competent enough to 
occupy these positions, thereby leading to inefficiencies. 
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Levin (2009) asserts that in public service, the academic experience is essential to holding a public office in 
most countries. A candidate with good academic background has the competencies and capabilities to hold 
public offices. Comparatively Southern African and North African countries base recruitments on merit as 
compared to the other regions. Employees in the regions with a low score on government effectiveness lack 
the rudimental training to work in public institutions (Miltin, 2008). Besides, these bureaucrats have low 
creative ability to innovate, leading to an inefficient performance in the various public sectors.
Mbaku (2000) argues that in some African countries, people hail corrupt public officials.  A gradual 
paradigm shift to the support of corrupt officials and hailing them as unsung heroes and heroines are 
detrimental to the quality of public institutions. Boafo-Arthur (2008) further adds that ethnocentrism and 
electoral politics drives corruption. Most of the people in different political parties would support their own 
even if the act has a ramification on the economy of a country. Thus corruption has led to weak state capacity 
of the public sector in some public institutions in other regions (East, West and Central African countries) on 
the continent as compared to other regions (Southern and North African countries).
The dwindling performance of government effectiveness in the public sector is due to central government 
sole distribution of resources, the appointment of high public positions by a sole state actor and centralization 
of political power (Gyimah-Boadi & Daddieh, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi & Mensah, 2003).
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Conclusively, the findings of the study reveal that political interference and electoral politics plays a 
significant role in the decline of the public sector in Africa. The decline is because of political parties privy to 
the term of office they have, manage the public institutions and resources abysmally. In addition to the above 
system, political interference contributes to the weak government effectiveness on the continent. Besides, the 
institutionalization of the multi-party system is a contributing factor to this menace which usually has its 
roots in political interference, lack of education and training, political parties funding and aftermath and 
corruption.
The results indicate that Southern African countries performed best as compared to its counterpart regions, 
followed by North Africa. However, East, West and Central African countries had low scores on government 
effectiveness. The results imply that electoral politics and political interference hurt the performances of 
public institutions on the continent. 
In sum, countries must reconsider multi-party democratization as it breeds inefficiencies in public 
institutions. Africa needs a clear and straightjacket distinction between policymaking and policy 
implementation to ensure the smooth running of public offices. Thus in terms of appointments of public 
officials and as long as enacted laws do not strengthen the positions of public officials and bureaucrats, Africa 
will continue to have weak and ineffective governments. Further research should consider political finance 
and how funding political parties affect government effectiveness in Africa. 
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